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Capital protected notes are very popular structured products since the internet bubble
burst in 2000. Investors are protected against large losses they could suﬀer if they
were investing directly in the underlying index or portfolio of stocks. It then seems
intuitive that such products are attractive for loss averse investors. However, using
a simple version of cumulative prospect theory, we show that these products are
not attractive when the investor takes either the underlying index or the risk-free
investment as the reference point. She always prefer an investment in the index or in
the risk-free portfolio, depending on her coeﬃcient of loss aversion.
JEL classiﬁcation: G11
Keywords : Structured ﬁnance, prospect theory, loss aversion, capital protection1I N T R O D U C T I O N
In recent years, especially after the internet bubble burst in 2000, a lot of structured
products have been issued by banks and other ﬁnancial institutions. They are usually
built as portfolios of more basic ﬁnancial securities, like stocks, indices or options on
diverse underlying assets. Their purpose is to cater to the needs of diﬀerent categories
of customers. Retail customers are then oﬀered sophisticated positions in options
without having to build complex portfolios by themselves. A large proportion of
these products oﬀer partial or total capital protection, at least in nominal terms.
Many of these products are quoted on the AMEX or the NYSE. To take a simple
example among others, Morgan Stanley issued in July 2003 a capital protected note
indexed on the S&P 5001. It matures in January 2011, insures 100 % of the initial
capital at the maturity date, pays no interest, but provides 80 % of the index return
(called the participation rate) at the maturity date if the performance2 of the index
is positive. It is then equivalent to a direct investment in the index, protected by
an at-the-money put option. The put option is ﬁnanced by selling 20% (called the
concession rate) of an at-the-money call on the index. In general, issuers of such notes
promote the capital protection by comparing their products to a direct investment
in the index, especially in case of a large drop. In others words, they take as the
reference investment the index or, more generally, the underlying portfolio on which
the return of the note is indexed.
If investors are assumed loss averse, it seems very natural for banks, on a com-
1The prospectus can be found on www.amex.com.
2Here, the performance doesn’t include dividends.
1mercial point of view, to propose capital protected notes which prevent investors to
suﬀer large losses. However, the key question is to know what is the reference to
which the notes are compared. In this paper, we then consider investors obeying a
simple version of cumulative prospect theory3 (CPT in the following) and compare
the utility they get from investing in the notes with the one obtained by investing in
the index or in the risk-free asset. As value comes from gain and losses in CPT, the
choice of the reference point is important to evaluate a risky prospect. Nevertheless,
the reference point chosen by an investor is not independent of the way these prod-
ucts are presented and advertised by issuers. For example, insisting on the guarantee
provided by the contract induces a comparison with a direct investment in the under-
lying index. On the contrary, if the focus is put on the participation rate and then
on the possibility to obtain high returns, it assumes an implicit comparison with the
status quo or with an investment in the risk-free asset.
In this paper, we ﬁrst show that if the investor takes the underlying index as
the reference point, it is never optimal to invest in such notes. The reason is very
simple. When the index is taken as the reference, the results provided by the note
are perceived as gains when the index value falls below the guaranteed level, that
is to say, when the insurance provided by the issuer starts to work. But when the
index level increases, the investor loses a part of the performance corresponding to
the concession rate. In other words it is perceived as a loss.
If the reference point of the investor is the status quo (or an investment in the risk-
free asset), we ﬁnd that the valuation function is maximized for an investment in the
3Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kahneman (1992).
2index or in the risk-free investment, depending on the level of loss aversion. It means
that these structured products never seem attractive to the loss averse investor.
Most studies on structured products concern the question of pricing. Wilkens et
al. (2003) and Stoimenov and Wilkens (2005) show that structured products are often
overpriced on the German market, especially on the primary market. The overpricing
tends to decrease on the secondary market as the maturity date approaches. Com-
parable results are obtained by Burth et al. (2001) and Grünbichler and Wohlend
(2005) on the Swiss market.
In a theoretical framework, Carlin (2007) predicts that this increase in proﬁts
for the issuers is partly due to the complexity of structured products. However,
Horst and Veld (2008) detect a clear overpricing when comparing simple warrants
issued by banks to the corresponding exchange traded options. Saying that structured
products are overpriced is essentially based on a no arbitrage argument. A structured
product is, in most cases, a portfolio of an underlying asset and options on this
asset. Consequently, option pricing models and associated implicit volatilities can be
used to value these products and conclude if they are overpriced or not. However,
usual pricing models don’t take into account the fact that banks provide a service to
customers in building and managing these sophisticated portfolios. In other words,
overpricing can simply be a payment for the service provided by the issuer.
There are in fact many ways to design structured products but we will focus on
one of the most simple categories. We concentrate our attention on capital protected
notes which guarantee a given proportion of the initial capital and retain a given part
of the potential proﬁts.
3Obviously, issuers and customers have conﬂicting interests in the design of the
notes. The former want to minimize the return paid and the risk borne when the
latter looks for an attractive risk/return couple, that is to say, an attractive expected
return and a high level of capital protection. The two steps in building structured
products are the following (Breuer and Perst, 2007):
1) Evaluation of the costs of designing speciﬁc risk/return proﬁles by means
of theoretic tools based on arbitrage considerations;
2) Evaluation of the utility gains for the customer.
The way utility is measured is essential at this stage and is closely linked to
investors’ preferences. For example, the chance of incurring a large loss, relative to
what is expected, was ranked as the ﬁrst attribute of risk in a survey by Olsen (1997).
Using interview data from a sample of traders and managers in four investment banks,
Willman et al. (2002) also conclude that managers focus on avoiding losses rather
than making gains
Searching capital protection can also be justiﬁed, at the theoretical level, by loss
aversion. It is a fundamental characteristic of individual agents in cumulative prospect
theory (CPT in the following) developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and
Tversky and Kahneman (1992). This model of decision-making under risk is one of
the most promising alternative approaches to the standard expected utility model
because it proposes reasonable solutions to many ﬁnancial puzzles. It was essen-
tially motivated by the numerous observations of violations of the von Neumann and
Morgenstern (1947) axioms, but also by the observation that many agents acquire
simultaneously insurance contracts and tickets for unfair lotteries.
4In the present paper, we analyze the optimal structure of the capital protected
notes described above, for a client obeying CPT, under some constraints on the
issuer side, the simplest one being that the initial amount paid by the investor is
the “fair” date-0 value of the ﬁnal payoﬀ. The structured products considered here
are characterized by two parameters: the ﬁrst one is the proportion of the initial
investment guaranteed to the investor at the maturity date, the second one is the
participation rate in case of an increase of the underlying index. Even if two sets of
parameters are equivalent in strictly ﬁnancial terms (using no arbitrage arguments),
an investor obeying CPT will prefer one of the two sets, taking into account her
objective function. Therefore, our contributions are the following: ﬁrst, we solve the
optimization problem of a CPT investor for diﬀerent reference points (the underlying
index and the risk-free investment). We show that the underlying index is never
a "good" reference to promote such notes because they are always dominated by a
direct investment in the underlying index. Third, when the reference of the investor
is the risk-free investment, we show that she prefers either to invest in the index or
in the risk-free asset, depending on her coeﬃcient of loss aversion.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the ﬁnal payoﬀsa n dt h e
arbitrage-free price of the capital protected notes under consideration. Section 3
brieﬂy summarizes the main features of CPT and justiﬁes our assumptions concerning
the parameters of the valuation function. Section 4 solves the optimal design problem
for CPT investors with diﬀerent reference points and presents our essential results.
Finally, section 5 concludes the paper and proposes some extensions.
52 CAPITAL PROTECTED NOTES
We consider a capital protected note (henceforth CPN) linked to an index (or a port-
folio of stocks). It provides some capital protection to the investor but this guarantee
is ﬁnanced by giving up a given proportion of the proﬁts, called the concession rate.
2.1 FINAL PAYOFF AND ARBITRAGE-FREE PRICE OF
CPNs
We assume that the underlying index value S is driven by a geometric brownian
motion S =( St,t∈ [0;T]) with parameters (μ,σ), where T is the maturity date of
the CPN X under consideration. The stochastic process of the value of X is also
denoted X =( Xt,t ∈ [0;T]),X T being the ﬁnal payoﬀ received by the investor at
date T.
XT is deﬁned by:
XT = θS0 +m a x ( ST − θS0;0)− (1 − α)max(ST − max(θ;1)S0;0) (1)
where θS0 is the guaranteed amount at the maturity date and α is the participation
rate. The strike price max(θ;1)S0 appears in the last term of the RHS of equation
(1) to take into account the case θ>1.
The ﬁnal value of the index is given by:








6where Z =( Zt,t≥ 0) denotes a standard brownian motion.
It is assumed that S0 is the initial amount paid by the investor to buy the note,
and also the initial value of the underlying index. The strategy is then characterized
by the two parameters (α,θ).I nf a c t ,i fθ ≤ 1 and the ﬁnal price ST is greater than
S0, the investor receives S0 +α(ST −S0).I fST lies between θS0 and S0, the investor
is paid ST. Finally, in the case θ>1, the investor receives θS0+α(ST −θS0) when the
underlying ﬁnal price is above θS0. It is worth to notice that in most practical cases,
t h eg u a r a n t e e da m o u n ti sa tm o s tS0 or, in other words, usual contracts correspond
to θ ≤ 1. Figure 1 shows the ﬁnal payoﬀ o ft h en o t ea saf u n c t i o no ft h eu n d e r l y i n g
value when S0 =1 ,θ=0 .9 and α =0 .6.
Figure 1 around here
Under the no arbitrage assumption we get:
X0 = e
−rTEQ [XT] (2)
where r is the continuous risk-free rate and EQ[.] is the expectation operator with
respect to the risk-neutral probability Q.
Equation (2) is equivalent to:
X0 = e
−rTθS0 + C(θS0,r) − (1 − α)C(max(θ,1)S0,r) (3)
where C(Y,r) is the date-0 Black-Scholes price of a call option with maturity T,a
strike price equal to Y a n da ni n t e r e s tr a t ee q u a lt or.
7In a perfect market, X0 = S0 since S0 is the amount initially paid by the investor






= C(θS0,r) − (1 − α)C(ξS0,r) (4)
with ξ =m a x ( θ;1).
We then have the following preliminary lemma.
Lemma 1 The parameters (α,θ) satisfying equation (4) do not depend on S0.
Proof. Obvious, because the call prices are homogeneous of degree 1 in S0.
Lemma 1 allows to normalize the problem with S0 =1 . This assumption will be
used in the rest of the paper. Equation (4) is then equivalent to:
1 − θe
−rT = C(θ,r) − (1 − α)C(ξ,r) (5)
2.2 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CAPITAL PROTECTION
AND PARTICIPATION RATE

















and d2(γ,r)=d1(γ,r) − σ
√
T
We specify the two variables (θ,r) or (ξ,r) in the expression of d1 and d2 because
we will use, in section 4, other formulas with (θ,μ) or (ξ,μ).
In equation (6), α can be expressed in an explicit way as a function of θ. We get:
α =1 −







Equation (8) comes from the put-call parity relationship. The concession rate
1−α is then the ratio of two option prices, a put with a strike price θ and a call with
as t r i k ep r i c eξ.
It is worth to note that if θ = erT, the no-arbitrage assumption implies α =0 .
In fact, the put price and the call price are equal when the strike price is erT. The
CPN becomes a risk-free asset in this case. If θ =0(no guarantee is provided), then
α =1 . If it was not the case, there would be an arbitrage opportunity.








This case has not much practical interest since almost all products issued in recent
years guarantee 100 % of the initial investment or less. It is essentially linked to the
9"low" interest rates and to the maturity of the note which is often short or medium.
However, it is easy to imagine a long-term issue in a high-interest rate period where
it is necessary for the issuer to propose more than 100 % of the initial investment
to attract investors. An other more common way to provide more than a 100 %
protection is to pay yearly coupons on the note and to keep θ =1 0 0%. This case
will not be analyzed here.
The sensitivity of α with respect to the level of capital protection is given in
proposition 3. It is based on the following lemma which recalls, with our notations
and assumptions, the derivatives of option prices with respect to the exercise price.
Lemma 2 Let σ and T be positive constants, N(x) denote the cumulative distribution
















and d2(a,b)=d1(a,b) − σ
√
T









Proof. See the Appendix.
10Notations of lemma 2 lead to write the concession rate as the ratio of two option
prices in the following form:











< 0 if θ<1 (11)
= e
−rT N(d2(θ,r)) − N(d1(θ,r))




Proof. See the appendix
The results of proposition 3 are very intuitive because when the level of capital
protection increases, the cost of the insurance provided to the investor also increases,
and so does the concession rate. Consequently, the participation rate decreases when
the proportion of capital guaranteed to the investor increases. Figure 2 shows the




.The function α(θ) is not diﬀerentiable at θ =1as can be observed
in proposition 3. All the points on the curve are equivalent in strictly ﬁnancial
terms as they correspond to a structured product whose value is equal to the initial
investment. The question we will address later on concerns the choice of a loss averse
investor if he is oﬀered such contracts. Which contract is preferred among the set of
"fair" contracts?
Figure 2 around here
11We also observe on the ﬁgure that for θ<0.6,αis almost 1. It is simply explained
b yt h ef a c tt h a ts u c ha ne x e r c i s ep r i c ec o r r e s p o n d st oaw i d e l yo u to ft h em o n e yp u t .
The probability that ST <θis small (the maturity being one year in this example)
and the investor is not ready to pay much for such a protection. On the other side,
a complete protection of the initial amount (in nominal terms) leads to a concession
rate of about 60%. Due to the short maturity of the note, such a protection is
"expensive". When the risk-free rate is positive, increasing the horizon decreases the
probability of a negative return and then increases the corresponding α.
3 CUMULATIVE PROSPECT THEORY
3.1 THE VALUATION FUNCTION OF PROSPECT THE-
ORY
CPT was developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kahneman
(1992) as an alternative theory of decision making under risk, to take into account
the many violations of the usual assumptions of expected utility theory. The four
essential features of CPT are the following:
1) Investors value risky prospects with respect to a reference point which may
be the investor’s current wealth, for example when the outcomes are obtained im-
mediately, or the current wealth capitalized at the risk-free rate when outcomes are
obtained at a future date, as in Barberis et al. (2001). However, other reference points
may be used by investors, depending on the set of alternative available prospects.
2) Losses and gains are weighted diﬀerently in the valuation function. The per-
12ceived disutility of a 100$ loss is greater than the utility of 100$ gain.
3) Agents are risk-averse in the domain of gains and risk-lovers in the domain of
losses. In other words, when a portfolio generates losses, agents are ready to gamble
to avoid the largest ones.
4) Investors tend to overweigh the small probabilities of extreme events.
In this paper we are essentially interested in the ﬁrst two points for the following
reasons:
- we want to focus on the role of loss aversion in the attractiveness of capital
protected notes;
- we want to compare diﬀerent reference points in the evaluation of the notes for
loss averse investors.










where λ>1 i st h el o s sa v e r s i o nc o e ﬃcient and β<1 is aimed at taking into account
the diminishing sensitivity to gains and losses. In equation (12), x denotes a gain or
a loss with respect to the reference point which is discussed hereafter. Tversky and
Kahneman (1992) obtained λ =2 .25 and β =0 .88 using experimental data. It means
that v is only slightly concave over gains and slightly convex over losses. To simplify
the formulation of the problem and to obtain analytical results, we will choose β =1 .
Under this assumption, v is a piecewise linear valuation function.
133.2 ASSUMPTIONS ON THE REFERENCE POINT AND
THE VALUATION FUNCTION
In the present paper, our main goal is to analyze if CPNs improve the utility of
investors obeying cumulative prospect theory. Issuers of CPNs often promote capital
protection by comparing the payoﬀs to those of a direct investment in the underlying
asset or by emphasizing the upside potential by means of a comparison with a risk-
free investment. In the ﬁrst case, they insist on the guaranteed capital and in the
second case, they compare to an investment in a risk-free asset.
The question is to know if these reference points are good choices to promote
CPNs for loss averse investors. We will show that it is not the case. When investors
obey our simple version of prospect theory, they always prefer a direct investment in
the index or an investment in the risk-free asset, depending on their coeﬃcient of loss
aversion.
Let X∗ denote the reference level of ﬁnal wealth. According to CPT when β =1 ,
investors are supposed to maximize:
EP [v(XT − X
∗)] = EP [(XT − X
∗)+] − λEP [(X
∗ − XT)+] (13)
As mentioned before, there are several candidates for X∗. The ﬁrst one is the
terminal index level ST. Focusing on capital protection induces a direct comparison
between the probability distribution of the ﬁnal value of the CPN and the corre-
sponding distribution for the ﬁnal index value.
Other natural reference points are the initial wealth capitalized at the risk-free
14rate or simply the status quo, which is often referred to by issuers, especially when
the design of the CPN corresponds to θ =1 . In this case, advertising is focused on
the "no loss" investment. Whatever happens to the index, you will get back your
initial investment!
In the following section, we examine these possibilities but we merge the two last
ones in subsection 4.2 by assuming a zero risk-free rate.
4 THE OPTIMAL CHOICE OF A LOSS AVERSE
INVESTOR
We address now the question of the optimal contract for a loss averse investor obeying
our simple version of CPT. The main result is that investing in a CPN, as designed
before, is never optimal if either the ﬁnal value of the index or the risk-free investment
are taken as the reference portfolio. This result does not seem very intuitive. When
the index value is chosen as the reference it appears because, in a sense to be precised
later on, gains and losses are reversed. With the other reference, the coeﬃcient of loss
aversion determines the optimal investment which is either the index or the risk-free
asset.
4.1 THE INDEX AS THE REFERENCE POINT
When X∗ = ST, the expected valuation function is written:
EP [v(XT − ST)] = EP [(XT − ST)+] − λEP [(ST − XT)+]
15After normalizing the initial investment S0 to 1, we know that:
XT = θ +m a x ( ST − θ;0)− (1 − α)max(ST − ξ;0)
Therefore
XT − ST = θ − ST +m a x ( ST − θ;0)− (1 − α)max(ST − ξ;0) (14)
=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
−(1 − α)(ST − ξ) if ST >ξ
0 if θ ≤ ST ≤ ξ
θ − ST is ST <θ
This formulation is interesting due to the choice of the reference point. Gains
appear if the price of the underlying falls below the guaranteed amount θ and these
gains correspond to the loss of the issuer which guarantees the given amount when
she invests in the underlying asset.
From these equalities, we deduce:
E [v(XT − ST)] = EP [(θ − ST)+] − λ(1 − α)EP [(ST − ξ)+]
= e
μT [P(θ,μ) − λ(1 − α)C(ξ,μ)]
The second equality is obtained by using notations of lemma 2.
Maximizing the expected value function of the investor may now be written as a














The relationship between α and θ is in fact the participation constraint of the
issuer.
4.1.1 THE CASE OF PARTIAL PROTECTION θ<1










It allows to prove the following result
Proposition 4 It is never optimal for a loss averse investor to buy the capital pro-




= N(−d2(θ,μ)) − λe
(μ−r)T C(1,μ)
C(1,r)
N(−d2(θ,r)) < 0 (17)
where f denotes the density of the standard gaussian distribution.
Proof. See the Appendix
This result is not very intuitive because the disutility of the investor increases
when the proportion of capital protected by the note increases. However, the reference
being the index, an increasing level of protection generates a higher concession rate
17which is perceived as a loss when the index value increases. Moreover, on the side
of perceived gains, that is when the index value decreases, the amount of gains is
limited because the index value cannot fall below 0. On the side of losses (increase
in the index value), there is no theoretical limit to perceived losses.
4.1.2 THE CASE OF FULL PROTECTION
When θ ≥ 1, the ﬁn a lp a y m e n to ft h en o t ei sw r i t t e na sf o l l o w s :
XT = θ + αmax(ST − θ;0)









As in the proof of proposition 4, r<μimplies P(θ,μ) <P (θ,r) and C(θ,r) <
C(θ,μ). Therefore, F(θ) < 0 for θ>0 as far as λ>1.As F(0) = 0, investing in the
note is not valuable to the loss averse investor.
4.2 THE STATUS QUO AS THE REFERENCE POINT
We consider now the case of the status quo, chosen as the reference point in many
experiments. In our framework, it can also be viewed as an investment in the risk-free
asset when the interest rate is 0. In this section we then assume that r =0and μ is
simultaneously the expected return on the index and the risk premium. In this case
18we know that θ cannot be greater than 1; consequently ξ =1 . Moreover, we have the
following equivalence:
XT − 1 > 0 ⇔ ST > 1 (18)
The gain/loss of the note with respect to the status quo is then:
XT − 1=θ − 1+m a x ( ST − θ;0)− (1 − α)max(ST − 1;0) (19)
=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
α(ST − 1) if ST > 1
ST − 1 if θ ≤ ST ≤ 1
θ − 1 is ST <θ
The interpretation is rather intuitive. The participation rate being α and the
reference point being S0 =1 , the return on the index must be positive for the note
to generate a positive return, as stated in relation (18).
The expected valuation function, denoted as G(θ), is now written as:
max
θ
G(θ)=EP [(XT − 1)+] − λEP [(1 − XT)+] (20)
The following technical lemma will be useful to calculate the expected valuation
function of the investor.
Lemma 5 If g denotes the density of ST,p<qtwo constants and z ≤ q, we get:
q Z
p
(z − x)g(x)dx = z [N(−d2(q,μ)) − N(−d2(p,μ))] (21)
−e
μT [N (−d1(q,μ)) − N(−d1(p,μ))]
19When z = q, this equality is written:
q Z
p
(q − x)g(x)dx = e
μT[P(q,μ) − P(p,μ)] − (q − p)N(−d2(p,μ)) (22)
Proof. See the appendix















μT[P(1,μ) − P(θ,μ)] − (1 − θ)N(−d2(θ,μ))
¤
−λ(1 − θ)P({ST <θ })
But we know that P({ST <θ })=N(−d2(θ,μ)). The ﬁnal expression of G(θ) is
then:
G(θ)=e








C(1,μ) − λ(P(1,μ) − P(θ,μ))
¸
The second equality comes from the deﬁnition of α in equation (10).
Equation (24) implies that G(1) = 0 because P(1,0) = C(1,0).This result is not
surprising because a complete guarantee θ =1implies a null participation rate when
r =0 . Consequently the portfolio corresponding to θ =1is equal to the reference
portfolio (the risk-free investment).
20When θ =0 ,P(0,0) = P(0,μ)=0and we deduce:
G(0) = e
μT [C(1,μ) − λP(1,μ)]
It appears that for λ>1 suﬃciently high, this quantity is negative, leading to an
optimal choice corresponding to a strictly positive θ. It is economically sound that a
high level of loss aversion leads to a positive level of guarantee. However, the question
is to know if the optimal θ lies in the open interval ]0;1[.O nt h eo t h e rs i d e ,f o rl o w
levels of loss aversion, G(0) > 0=G(1). The reference portfolio is not optimal but we
have also to check if θ =0is an optimum or not. The following proposition answers
the two questions.
Proposition 6 The optimal value of θ is either 0 or 1 depending on the value of λ.
Proof. See the appendix


































Figure 4 provides the ratio in the LHS of equality (25) as a function of θ. The risk
21premium is 6 %, the volatility 20 % and the maturity is 1 year. Obviously the
ratio tends to 0 when θ tends to 0 because μ>0. Moreover, the ratio is always
below 1 for the same reason. Concerning the RHS of equation (25), we observe that
C(1,μ) >C (1,0) and μ>0 so eμTC(1,μ)/C(1,0) > 1. Consequently, ∂G/∂θ may
be equal to 0 only if the loss aversion coeﬃcient is suﬃciently large. Using the same
parameters, the RHS of equation (25) is equal to 0.645. When λ =2we get θ ≈ 85%.
However, as can be seen in the proof of proposition 6, the second derivative of G is
positive at the stationary point and this point is then not a maximum but a minimum.
Figure 4 around here
Figure 5 illustrates this point with the same parameters as before. We observe
that G decreases up to the stationary point and then becomes increasing, illustrating
the convexity of G around the stationary point.
Figure 5 around here
5C O N C L U D I N G R E M A R K S
In this paper, we obtained a rather counterintuitive result. We showed that loss
averse inverse investors never ﬁnd optimal to invest in a capital protected note when
their reference portfolio is either the underlying asset or the risk-free investment.
They prefer to directly invest in one of the two reference portfolios, depending on
their coeﬃcient of loss aversion. Nevertheless, these products are very popular and
this questions the assumptions of the usual theoretical models. The ﬁrst one is the
22geometric brownian assumption for the index value, a standard one in the world of
options since it allows to use the Black-Scholes model. Using fat tailed distributions
of returns could possibly explain the popularity of CPNs for loss averse investors but,
at the same time, it is well known that ﬁnancial institutions commonly use the Black-
Scholes model to price products with optional features. The second assumption that
may be questioned is the valuation function used in the paper. Using a piecewise linear
function may induce corner solutions, as it is the case in standard portfolio models.
However, it is worth to note that in our paper the valuation of the CPN is not linear
in θ; consequently, the usual drawback of piecewise linear utility functions cannot be
used to cast doubt on our results. Moreover, many simulations (not included in the
paper) with diﬀerent values of β ( t h ep o w e ri nt h ev a l u a t i o nf u n c t i o no fT v e r s k ya n d
Kahneman (1992)) lead to the same "all or nothing" solution.
It suggests the analysis of other structured products like the accelerating returns
notes or the BULS4 (Bullish Underlying Linked Securities) to get more insights on
the optimal design of structured notes for loss averse investors. At a more general
level, the question is to ﬁnd, for any given reference, the dominating portfolios. As
the payoﬀ of any index linked portfolio using plain-vanilla options can be represented
by a picewise linear function, the question to ﬁnd such functions that dominate a
given reference portfolio in the sense of CPT.
Appendix
P r o o fo fl e m m a2
4See for example Chen and Wu (2007).
23We give up the arguments (a,b) to simplify the notations. Let f(x) denote the





























































It is suﬃcient to use the symmetry of f(.) with respect to the origin to get the
desired result.
Proof of proposition 3
When θ<1, the result is a direct consequence of proposition 2 because the
denominator doesn’t depend on θ.







−e−rTC(θ,r) − (1 − θe−rT)∂C
∂θ(θ,r)
C(θ,r)2














−rT N(d2(θ,r)) − N(d1(θ,r))
C(θ,r)2
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n4
The expression of F g i v e ni ne q u a t i o n( 1 6 )a l l o w st oe x p r e s st h ed e r i v a t i v eo fF


















= N(−d2(θ,μ)) − ωe
−rTN(−d2(θ,r))







But r<μimplies P(θ,μ) <P (θ,r) and C(1,r) <C (1,μ) because a call (put)
price is an increasing (decreasing) function of the interest rate. Therefore, F(θ) < 0
as far as λ>1.
Concerning the sign of the derivative of F with respect to θ, we can write:
−d2(θ,μ)=










This inequality, combined with λ>1,μ > r and C(1,μ) >C (1,r) show that
∂F/∂θ < 0.
P r o o fo fl e m m a5
26q Z
p




























































































































= z [N(−d2(q,μ)) − N(−d2(p,μ))]
−e
μT [N (−d1(q,μ)) − N(−d1(p,μ))]







μT (P(q,μ) − P(p,μ)) = qN(−d2(q,μ)) − e
μTN(−d1(q,μ)) − pN(−d2(p,μ)) + e
μTN(−d1(p,μ))
= q[N(−d2(q,μ)) − N(−d2(p,μ))] + (q − p)N(−d2(p,μ))
−e




(q − x)g(x)dx = e
μT (P(q,μ) − P(p,μ)) − (q − p)N(−d2(p,μ))
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n6




















































For λ suﬃciently high, a stationary point for G may exist but it doesn’t always
correspond to a maximum and, in fact, it is a minimum here. To see this, we calculate









































































dt is increasing in y and
a<b ,as shown in (28).
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Figure 1: Payoﬀ of the note when S0 =1 ,θ=0 .9 and α =0 .6







Alfa Alfa vs Theta
Figure 2: α versus θ with r =4 % ,T =1 ,σ=2 0 %








Figure 3: Gains and losses with the index as the reference point






Figure 4: Ratio of N(−d2(θ,μ))/N(−d2(θ,r)) as a function of θ. μ =6 % ; σ =
20%,T =1 .





Figure 5: G(θ) as a function of θ with λ =2 .25;σ =0 .2;T =1 ;μ =0 .06
36             
PAPIERS 
 




D.R. n° 1  "Bertrand Oligopoly with decreasing returns to scale",  
 J. Thépot, décembre 1993 
 
D.R. n° 2  "Sur quelques méthodes d'estimation directe de la structure par terme 
    des taux d'intérêt", P. Roger - N. Rossiensky, janvier 1994 
 
D.R. n° 3  "Towards a Monopoly Theory in a Managerial Perspective", 
   J. Thépot, mai 1993 
 
D.R. n° 4  "Bounded Rationality in Microeconomics", J. Thépot, mai 1993 
 
D.R. n° 5  "Apprentissage Théorique et Expérience Professionnelle",  
     J. Thépot, décembre 1993 
 
D.R. n° 6  "Stratégic Consumers in a Duable-Goods Monopoly", 
  J. Thépot, avril 1994 
 
D.R. n° 7  "Vendre ou louer ; un apport de la théorie des jeux", J. Thépot, avril 1994 
 
D.R. n° 8  "Default Risk Insurance and Incomplete Markets", 
    Ph. Artzner - FF. Delbaen, juin 1994 
 
D.R. n° 9  "Les actions à réinvestissement optionnel du dividende", 
C.   Marie-Jeanne - P. Roger, janvier 1995 
 
D.R. n°  10  "Forme optimale des contrats d'assurance en présence de coûts 
    administratifs pour l'assureur", S. Spaeter, février 1995 
 
D.R. n° 11  "Une procédure de codage numérique des articles", 
        J. Jeunet, février 1995 
 
D.R. n° 12  Stabilité d'un diagnostic concurrentiel fondé sur une approche 
    markovienne du comportement de rachat du consommateur", 
N. Schall, octobre 1995 
 
D.R. n° 13  "A direct proof of the coase conjecture", J. Thépot, octobre 1995 
 
D.R. n° 14  "Invitation à la stratégie", J. Thépot, décembre 1995 
 
D.R. n° 15  "Charity and economic efficiency", J. Thépot, mai 1996 
 D.R. n° 16  "Princing anomalies in financial markets and non linear pricing rules", 
P.  Roger, mars 1996 
 
D.R. n° 17  "Non linéarité des coûts de l'assureur, comportement de prudence de 
    l'assuré et contrats optimaux", S. Spaeter, avril 1996 
 
D.R. n° 18  "La valeur ajoutée d'un partage de risque et l'optimum de Pareto : une 
    note", L. Eeckhoudt - P. Roger, juin 1996 
 
D.R. n° 19  "Evaluation of Lot-Sizing Techniques : A robustess and Cost Effectiveness 
    Analysis", J. Jeunet, mars 1996 
 
D.R. n° 20  "Entry accommodation with idle capacity", J. Thépot, septembre 1996 
 
D.R. n° 21  "Différences culturelles et satisfaction des vendeurs : Une comparaison 
    internationale", E. Vauquois-Mathevet - J.Cl. Usunier, novembre 1996 
 
D.R. n° 22  "Evaluation des obligations convertibles et options d'échange",  
A. Schmitt - F. Home, décembre 1996 
 
D.R n° 23  "Réduction d'un programme d'optimisation globale des coûts et  
    diminution du temps de calcul, J. Jeunet, décembre 1996 
 
D.R. n° 24  "Incertitude, vérifiabilité et observabilité : Une relecture de la 
    théorie de l'agence", J. Thépot, janvier 1997 
 
D.R. n° 25  "Financement par augmentation de capital avec asymétrie d'information : 
    l'apport du paiement du dividende en actions",  
C.   Marie-Jeanne, février 1997 
 
D.R. n° 26  "Paiement du dividende en actions et théorie du signal", 
C.   Marie-Jeanne, février 1997 
 
D.R. n° 27  "Risk aversion and the bid-ask spread", L. Eeckhoudt - P. Roger, avril 1997 
 
D.R. n° 28  "De l'utilité de la contrainte d'assurance dans les modèles à un risque et à 
    deux risques", S. Spaeter, septembre 1997 
 
D.R. n° 29  "Robustness and cost-effectiveness of lot-sizing techniques under revised  
    demand forecasts", J. Jeunet, juillet 1997 
 
D.R. n° 30  "Efficience du marché et comparaison de produits à l'aide des méthodes  
    d'enveloppe (Data envelopment analysis)", S. Chabi, septembre 1997 
 
D.R. n° 31  "Qualités de la main-d'œuvre et subventions à l'emploi : Approche  
    microéconomique", J. Calaza - P. Roger, février 1998 
 
D.R n° 32  "Probabilité de défaut et spread de taux : Etude empirique du marché français", 
M. Merli - P. Roger, février 1998 
 
 
D.R. n° 33  "Confiance et Performance : La thèse de Fukuyama",      J.Cl. Usunier - P. Roger, avril 1998 
 
D.R. n° 34  "Measuring the performance of lot-sizing techniques in uncertain 
    environments", J. Jeunet - N. Jonard, janvier 1998 
 
D.R. n° 35  "Mobilité et décison de consommation : premiers résultas dans un cadre  
    monopolistique", Ph. Lapp, octobre 1998 
 
D.R. n° 36  "Impact du paiement du dividende en actions sur le transfert de richesse et la  
    dilution du bénéfice par action", C. Marie-Jeanne, octobre 1998 
 
D.R. n° 37  "Maximum resale-price-maintenance as Nash condition", J. Thépot,  
novembre 1998 
 
D.R. n° 38  "Properties of bid and ask prices in the rank dependent expected utility model",    P. 
Roger, décembre 1998 
 
D.R. n° 39  "Sur la structure par termes des spreads de défaut des obligations »,  
 Maxime Merli / Patrick Roger, septembre 1998 
 
D.R. n° 40  "Le risque de défaut des obligations : un modèle de défaut temporaire de  l’émetteur", 
Maxime Merli, octobre 1998 
 
D.R. n° 41  "The Economics of Doping in Sports", Nicolas Eber / Jacques Thépot, 
février 1999 
 
D.R.  n°  42  "Solving large unconstrained multilevel lot-sizing problems using a hybrid genetic 
algorithm", Jully Jeunet, mars 1999 
 
D.R n° 43  "Niveau général des taux et spreads de rendement", Maxime Merli, mars 1999 
 
D.R. n° 44  "Doping in Sport and Competition Design", Nicolas Eber / Jacques Thépot,  
septembre 1999 
 
D.R. n° 45  "Interactions dans les canaux de distribution", Jacques Thépot, novembre 1999 
 
D.R. n° 46  "What sort of balanced scorecard for hospital", Thierry Nobre, novembre 1999 
 
D.R. n° 47  "Le contrôle de gestion dans les PME", Thierry Nobre, mars 2000 
 
D.R. n° 48  Stock timing using genetic algorithms", Jerzy Korczak – Patrick Roger,  
avril 2000 
 
D.R. n° 49  "On the long run risk in stocks : A west-side story", Patrick Roger, mai 2000 
 
D.R. n° 50  "Estimation des coûts de transaction sur un marché gouverné par les ordres : Le cas des 
composantes du CAC40", Laurent Deville, avril 2001 
 
D.R.  n°  51  "Sur une mesure d’efficience relative dans la théorie du portefeuille de Markowitz", 
Patrick Roger / Maxime Merli, septembre 2001 
 D.R. n° 52  "Impact de l’introduction du tracker Master Share CAC 40 sur la relation de parité call-
put", Laurent Deville, mars 2002 
 
D.R.  n°  53  "Market-making, inventories and martingale pricing", Patrick Roger / Christian At / 
Laurent Flochel, mai 2002 
 
D.R.  n°  54  "Tarification au coût complet en concurrence imparfaite", Jean-Luc Netzer / Jacques 
Thépot, juillet 2002 
 
D.R. n° 55  "Is time-diversification efficient for a loss averse investor ?", Patrick Roger,  
janvier 2003 
 
D.R. n° 56  “Dégradations de notations du leader et effets de contagion”, Maxime Merli / Alain Schatt, 
avril 2003 
 
D.R. n° 57  “Subjective evaluation, ambiguity and relational contracts”, Brigitte Godbillon,  
juillet 2003 
 
D.R. n° 58  “A View of the European Union as an Evolving Country Portfolio”,  
Pierre-Guillaume Méon / Laurent Weill, juillet 2003 
 
D.R. n° 59  “Can Mergers in Europe Help Banks Hedge Against Macroeconomic Risk ?”,  
Pierre-Guillaume Méon / Laurent Weill, septembre 2003 
 
D.R.  n°  60  “Monetary policy in the presence of asymmetric wage indexation”, Giuseppe Diana / 
Pierre-Guillaume Méon, juillet 2003 
 
D.R. n° 61  “Concurrence bancaire et taille des conventions de services”, Corentine Le Roy, novembre 
2003 
 
D.R. n° 62  “Le petit monde du CAC 40”, Sylvie Chabi / Jérôme Maati 
 
D.R. n° 63  “Are Athletes Different ? An Experimental Study Based on the Ultimatum Game”, Nicolas 
Eber / Marc Willinger 
 
D.R. n° 64  “Le rôle de l’environnement réglementaire, légal et institutionnel dans la défaillance des 
banques : Le cas des pays émergents”, Christophe Godlewski, janvier 2004 
 
D.R. n° 65  “Etude de la cohérence des ratings de banques avec la probabilité de défaillance bancaire 
dans les pays émergents”, Christophe Godlewski, Mars 2004 
 
D.R. n° 66  “Le comportement des étudiants sur le marché du téléphone mobile : Inertie, captivité ou 
fidélité ?”, Corentine Le Roy, Mai 2004 
 
D.R. n° 67  “Insurance  and  Financial  Hedging  of Oil Pollution Risks”, André Schmitt / Sandrine 
Spaeter, September, 2004 
 
D.R. n° 68  “On the Backwardness in Macroeconomic Performance of European Socialist Economies”, 
Laurent Weill, September, 2004 
 
D.R. n° 69  “Majority voting with stochastic preferences : The whims of a committee are smaller than 
the whims of its members”, Pierre-Guillaume Méon, September, 2004  
D.R. n° 70  “Modélisation de la prévision de défaillance de la banque : Une application aux banques 
des pays émergents”, Christophe J. Godlewski, octobre 2004 
 
D.R.  n°  71  “Can bankruptcy law discriminate between heterogeneous firms when information is 
incomplete ? The case of legal sanctions”, Régis Blazy, october 2004 
 
D.R. n° 72  “La performance économique et financière des jeunes entreprises”,  
Régis Blazy/Bertrand Chopard, octobre 2004 
 
D.R. n° 73  “Ex Post Efficiency of bankruptcy procedures : A general normative framework”,  
Régis Blazy / Bertrand Chopard, novembre 2004 
 
D.R. n° 74  “Full cost pricing and organizational structure”, Jacques Thépot, décembre 2004 
 
D.R. n° 75  “Prices as strategic substitutes in the Hotelling duopoly”, Jacques Thépot,  
décembre 2004 
 
D.R. n° 76  “Réflexions sur l’extension récente de la statistique de prix et de production à la santé et à 
l’enseignement”, Damien Broussolle, mars 2005 
 
D.  R.  n°  77  “Gestion du risque de crédit dans la banque  : Information hard, information soft et 
manipulation ”, Brigitte Godbillon-Camus / Christophe J. Godlewski 
 
D.R. n° 78   “Which Optimal Design For LLDAs”, Marie Pfiffelmann 
 
D.R. n° 79  “Jensen and Meckling 30 years after : A game theoretic view”, Jacques Thépot 
 
D.R. n° 80  “Organisation artistique et dépendance à l’égard des ressources”, Odile Paulus, novembre 
2006 
 
D.R. n° 81  “Does collateral help mitigate adverse selection ? A cross-country analysis”,  
Laurent Weill –Christophe J. Godlewski, novembre 2006 
 
D.R.  n°  82  “Why do banks ask for collateral and which ones ?”, Régis Blazy - Laurent Weill, 
décembre 2006 
 
D.R. n° 83  “The peace of work agreement : The emergence and enforcement of a swiss labour market 
institution”, D. Broussolle, janvier 2006. 
 
D.R. n° 84  “The new approach to international trade in services in view of services specificities : 
Economic and regulation issues”, D. Broussolle, septembre 2006. 
 
D.R. n° 85  “Does the consciousness of the disposition effect increase the equity premium” ?,  
P. Roger, juin 2007 
 
D.R. n° 86  “Les déterminants de la décision de syndication bancaire en France”, Ch. J. Godlewski 
 
D.R. n° 87  “Syndicated loans in emerging markets”, Ch. J. Godlewski / L. Weill, mars 2007 
 
D.R.  n°  88  “Hawks and loves in segmented markets : A formal approach to competitive 
aggressiveness”, Claude d’Aspremont / R. Dos Santos Ferreira / J. Thépot,  mai 2007 
 
D.R. n° 89  “On the optimality of the full cost pricing”, J. Thépot, février 2007 
 
D.R. n° 90  “SME’s main bank choice and organizational structure : Evidence from France”, H. El 
Hajj Chehade / L. Vigneron, octobre 2007 
  
D.R n° 91  “How to solve St Petersburg Paradox in Rank-Dependent Models” ?,  
M. Pfiffelmann, octobre 2007 
 
D.R. n° 92  “Full market opening in the postal services facing the social and territorial cohesion goal in 
France”, D. Broussolle, novembre 2007 
 
D.R. n° 2008-01 A behavioural Approach to financial puzzles, M.H. Broihanne, M. Merli,  
    P. Roger, janvier 2008 
 
D.R. n° 2008-02 What drives the arrangement timetable of bank loan syndication ?, Ch. J. Godlewski, 
février 2008 
 
D.R. n° 2008-03 Financial intermediation and macroeconomic efficiency, Y. Kuhry, L. Weill, février 
2008 
 
D.R. n° 2008-04 The effects of concentration on competition and efficiency : Some evidence from the 
french audit market, G. Broye, L. Weill, février 2008 
 
D.R. n° 2008-05 Does financial intermediation matter for macroeconomic efficiency?, P.G. Méon, L. 
Weill, février 2008 
 
D.R. n° 2008-06   Is corruption an efficient grease ?, P.G. Méon, L. Weill, février 2008 
 
D.R. n° 2008-07  Convergence in banking efficiency across european countries, L. Weill, février 2008 
 
D.R. n° 2008-08  Banking environment, agency costs, and loan syndication : A cross-country analysis, 
Ch. J. Godlewski, mars 2008 
 
D.R. n° 2008-09  Are French individual investors reluctant to realize their losses ?, Sh. Boolell-Gunesh / 
M.H. Broihanne / M. Merli, avril 2008 
 
D.R. n° 2008-10  Collateral and adverse selection in transition countries, Ch. J. Godlewski / L. Weill, 
avril 2008 
 
D.R.  n°  2008-11  How many banks does it take to lend ? Empirical evidence from Europe, Ch. J. 
Godlewski, avril 2008. 
 
D.R. n° 2008-12  Un portrait de l’investisseur individuel français, Sh. Boolell-Gunesh, avril 2008 
 
D.R. n° 2008-13   La déclaration de mission, une revue de la littérature, Odile Paulus, juin 2008 
 
D.R. n° 2008-14   Performance et risque des entreprises appartenant à des groupes de PME,  
Anaïs Hamelin, juin 2008 
 
D.R. n° 2008-15  Are private banks more efficient than public banks ? Evidence from Russia,    Alexei Karas / Koen Schoors / Laurent Weill, septembre 2008 
 
D.R. n° 2008-16  Capital protected notes for loss averse investors : A counterintuitive result,  
  Patrick Roger, septembre 2008 
 
D.R. n° 2008-17  Mixed risk aversion and preference for risk disaggregation, Patrick Roger,  
 octobre  2008 
 
 